EXCERPTS:
"Why are politicians so focused on one set of people, at the expense of other people? Because "saving" one set of people increases the chances of getting those people's votes. Letting supply and demand determine what happens in the housing market gets nobody's votes.
If current occupants are put out of their homes and the prices come down to a level where others can afford to buy those homes, nobody will give politicians credit-- or, more to the point, their votes. Nor should they.
Rescuing particular people at the expense of other people-- whether the others are taxpayers, savers or prospective home buyers-- produces votes. It also produces dependency on government, which is good for politicians, but bad for society.
Showing posts with label Housing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Housing. Show all posts
Saturday, February 5, 2011
Tuesday, October 5, 2010
Foreclosure? Not So Fast: Homeowners Cite Paperwork Problems to Fight Foreclosure - WSJ.com
EXCERPTS:
"LOXAHATCHEE, Fla.—Israel Machado's foreclosure started out as a routine affair. In the summer of 2008, as the economy began to soften, Mr. Machado's pool-cleaning business suffered and like millions of other Americans, he fell behind on his $400,000 mortgage.
But Mr. Machado's response was unlike most other Americans'. Instead of handing his home over to the lender, IndyMac Bank FSB, he hired Ice Legal LP in nearby Royal Palm Beach to fight the foreclosure. The law firm researched the history of Mr. Machado's loan and found two interesting facts.
First, the affidavits IndyMac used to file the foreclosure were signed by a so-called robo-signer named Erica A. Johnson-Seck, who routinely signed 6,000 documents a week related to foreclosures and bankruptcy. That volume, the court decided, meant Ms. Johnson-Seck couldn't possibly have thoroughly reviewed the facts of Mr. Machado's case, as required by law.
Secondly, IndyMac (now called OneWest Bank) no longer owned the loan—a group of investors in a securitized trust managed by Deutsche Bank did. Determining that IndyMac didn't really have standing to foreclose, a judge threw out the case and ordered IndyMac to pay Mr. Machado's $30,000 legal bill.
***
In Florida, which leads the nation in foreclosure filings, loans remain delinquent for an average of 573 days before going to foreclosure, according to LPS Applied Analytics, a research firm. A year ago it took 423 days, an indication that the foreclosure process is lengthening. Nationwide, the average foreclosure takes 478 days, up from 361 days a year ago. At the height of the housing boom in early 2006, the foreclosure delinquency average stood at 292 days nationwide and 305 days in Florida.
"LOXAHATCHEE, Fla.—Israel Machado's foreclosure started out as a routine affair. In the summer of 2008, as the economy began to soften, Mr. Machado's pool-cleaning business suffered and like millions of other Americans, he fell behind on his $400,000 mortgage.
But Mr. Machado's response was unlike most other Americans'. Instead of handing his home over to the lender, IndyMac Bank FSB, he hired Ice Legal LP in nearby Royal Palm Beach to fight the foreclosure. The law firm researched the history of Mr. Machado's loan and found two interesting facts.
First, the affidavits IndyMac used to file the foreclosure were signed by a so-called robo-signer named Erica A. Johnson-Seck, who routinely signed 6,000 documents a week related to foreclosures and bankruptcy. That volume, the court decided, meant Ms. Johnson-Seck couldn't possibly have thoroughly reviewed the facts of Mr. Machado's case, as required by law.
Secondly, IndyMac (now called OneWest Bank) no longer owned the loan—a group of investors in a securitized trust managed by Deutsche Bank did. Determining that IndyMac didn't really have standing to foreclose, a judge threw out the case and ordered IndyMac to pay Mr. Machado's $30,000 legal bill.
***
In Florida, which leads the nation in foreclosure filings, loans remain delinquent for an average of 573 days before going to foreclosure, according to LPS Applied Analytics, a research firm. A year ago it took 423 days, an indication that the foreclosure process is lengthening. Nationwide, the average foreclosure takes 478 days, up from 361 days a year ago. At the height of the housing boom in early 2006, the foreclosure delinquency average stood at 292 days nationwide and 305 days in Florida.
Saturday, February 20, 2010
Interesting summary of the housing crisis - WSJ.com
EXCERPT:
"During the housing boom bankers made a raft of extraordinarily foolish loans. Some were the result of lenders defrauding borrowers; probably at least as many were the product of borrowers defrauding lenders. But there is no evidence ... that lender fraud was the overriding cause of the crisis.
The bank loans were not foolish because borrowers didn't realize what they were doing. They were foolish because of the incentives they created for borrowers, especially when housing prices turned south.
There were three distinct stages of the housing crisis. In the first, the Federal Reserve's extremely low interest rates from 2001-2004 induced consumers to switch from fixed to adjustable rate mortgages and drew short-term speculators and house-flippers into the market in certain cities. The Fed's increase in short-term interest rates over the next two years increased homeowner payments and precipitated a round of defaults.
My own research confirms the analysis provided by University of Texas economist Stan Leibowitz on these pages last July: The initial onset of the foreclosure crisis was a problem of adjustable-rate mortgages, whether prime or subprime. It was not initially a subprime problem.
In the second phase, falling home prices provided incentives for owners whose mortgages were under water to walk away from their houses. And in the third phase, which we are now experiencing, traditional macroeconomic factors like unemployment led to more foreclosures—especially where homeowners' mortgages are already underwater. Reflecting this situation, the Mortgage Bankers Association reports that the fastest-rising segment of foreclosures in recent months has been traditional prime, fixed-rate mortgages.
None of this analysis has anything to do with fraud or consumer protection problems. "
"During the housing boom bankers made a raft of extraordinarily foolish loans. Some were the result of lenders defrauding borrowers; probably at least as many were the product of borrowers defrauding lenders. But there is no evidence ... that lender fraud was the overriding cause of the crisis.
The bank loans were not foolish because borrowers didn't realize what they were doing. They were foolish because of the incentives they created for borrowers, especially when housing prices turned south.
There were three distinct stages of the housing crisis. In the first, the Federal Reserve's extremely low interest rates from 2001-2004 induced consumers to switch from fixed to adjustable rate mortgages and drew short-term speculators and house-flippers into the market in certain cities. The Fed's increase in short-term interest rates over the next two years increased homeowner payments and precipitated a round of defaults.
My own research confirms the analysis provided by University of Texas economist Stan Leibowitz on these pages last July: The initial onset of the foreclosure crisis was a problem of adjustable-rate mortgages, whether prime or subprime. It was not initially a subprime problem.
In the second phase, falling home prices provided incentives for owners whose mortgages were under water to walk away from their houses. And in the third phase, which we are now experiencing, traditional macroeconomic factors like unemployment led to more foreclosures—especially where homeowners' mortgages are already underwater. Reflecting this situation, the Mortgage Bankers Association reports that the fastest-rising segment of foreclosures in recent months has been traditional prime, fixed-rate mortgages.
None of this analysis has anything to do with fraud or consumer protection problems. "
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
Video: Thomas Sowell on the Housing Boom and Bust
"Thomas Sowell discusses how we got into the current economic disaster that developed out of the economics and politics of the housing boom and bust."
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
Solving Whose Problem? - Thomas Sowell
Solving Whose Problem?
By Thomas Sowell
No one will really understand politics until they understand that politicians are not trying to solve our problems. They are trying to solve their own problems-- of which getting elected and re-elected are number one and number two. Whatever is number three is far behind.
Many of the things the government does that may seem stupid are not stupid at all, from the standpoint of the elected officials or bureaucrats who do these things.
The current economic downturn that has cost millions of people their jobs began with successive administrations of both parties pushing banks and other lenders to make mortgage loans to people whose incomes, credit history and inability or unwillingness to make a substantial down payment on a house made them bad risks.
Was that stupid? Not at all. The money that was being put at risk was not the politicians' money, and in most cases was not even the government's money. Moreover, the jobs that are being lost by the millions are not the politicians' jobs-- and jobs in the government's bureaucracies are increasing.
No one pushed these reckless mortgage lending policies more than Congressman Barney Frank, who brushed aside warnings about risk, and said in 2003 that he wanted to 'roll the dice' even more in the housing markets. But it would very rash to bet against Congressman Frank's getting re-elected in 2010."
By Thomas Sowell
No one will really understand politics until they understand that politicians are not trying to solve our problems. They are trying to solve their own problems-- of which getting elected and re-elected are number one and number two. Whatever is number three is far behind.
Many of the things the government does that may seem stupid are not stupid at all, from the standpoint of the elected officials or bureaucrats who do these things.
The current economic downturn that has cost millions of people their jobs began with successive administrations of both parties pushing banks and other lenders to make mortgage loans to people whose incomes, credit history and inability or unwillingness to make a substantial down payment on a house made them bad risks.
Was that stupid? Not at all. The money that was being put at risk was not the politicians' money, and in most cases was not even the government's money. Moreover, the jobs that are being lost by the millions are not the politicians' jobs-- and jobs in the government's bureaucracies are increasing.
No one pushed these reckless mortgage lending policies more than Congressman Barney Frank, who brushed aside warnings about risk, and said in 2003 that he wanted to 'roll the dice' even more in the housing markets. But it would very rash to bet against Congressman Frank's getting re-elected in 2010."
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
One in Four Borrowers Is Underwater - WSJ.com
EXCERPTS:
"Homeowners in Nevada, Arizona, Florida and California are more likely to be deeply under water, according to the analysis. In Nevada, for example, nearly 30% of borrowers owe 50% or more on their mortgage than their home is worth, said First American.
More than 40% of borrowers who took out a mortgage in 2006 -- when home prices peaked -- are under water. Prices have dropped so much in some parts of the U.S. that some borrowers who took out loans more than five years ago owe more than their home's value...."
"Homeowners in Nevada, Arizona, Florida and California are more likely to be deeply under water, according to the analysis. In Nevada, for example, nearly 30% of borrowers owe 50% or more on their mortgage than their home is worth, said First American.
More than 40% of borrowers who took out a mortgage in 2006 -- when home prices peaked -- are under water. Prices have dropped so much in some parts of the U.S. that some borrowers who took out loans more than five years ago owe more than their home's value...."
Lunsford put 20% down when he bought his home in Las Vegas for $530,000 in 2004. Now, he said, his home was worth less than $300,000.
"I'm to the point where I feel I will never get my head above water," said Mr. Lunsford, a retired state trooper who works for an insurance company. He said his bank won't modify his loan because he can afford his payments, and he's unwilling to walk away, he said: "We're too honest."
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)